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IF IT’S TUESDAY, THIS MUST BE PROCREATION: 
METHODOLOGY AND SUBJECT-MATTER IN FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT PEDAGOGY 
WILLIAM D. ARAIZA* 
In the 1969 movie, If It’s Tuesday, This Must Be Belgium, a busload of 
American tourists is whisked through Europe on a nine-country, eighteen-day 
tour of the continent that leaves them more confused than enlightened. The title 
is based on a 1957 New Yorker cartoon, in which two women standing next to a 
tour bus in the shadow of an Italian campanile consult an itinerary, one of them 
insisting: “But if it’s Tuesday, it has to be Siena.” The movie and the cartoon 
make the same joke: first-time visitors to Europe are thrown onto a bus and 
driven across a countryside that appears only as a blur, and they receive only the 
shallowest of information from their tour guide and itinerary. 
Constitutional law classes in American law schools can feel the same way. 
The sheer number of topics to be covered (nine countries) in a relatively small 
number of units (eighteen days) imposes enormous pressure on the 
professor/tour guide to move quickly, pointing out landmarks along the way 
while barely slowing down. Of course, alternatives to such tours exist. Most 
notably, a professor can provide a curated tour, sharply limiting coverage in a 
way that allows students more time to focus on the topics and cases the professor 
chooses to retain on the itinerary. But just like curated tours of Europe, this 
approach to teaching constitutional law in general (and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular) deprives the first-time student/tourist of a 
comprehensive introduction to the subject. Such truncated coverage may impact 
students’ future understanding, by failing to introduce them to topics and thus 
narrowing the foundation upon which they ultimately build that understanding. 
But there is an alternative. My casebook1 focuses on methodologies of 
constitutional decision-making, rather than using topics or subject-matter as its 
primary organizing tools. As this Essay explains, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
particularly well-suited for this pedagogical approach. Fourteenth Amendment 
 
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Araiza’s most recent book is ANIMUS: A 
SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017). Professor Araiza wishes to thank the Saint 
Louis University Law Journal for inviting him to contribute to Teaching the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 1. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, APPROACHES, AND APPLICATIONS 
(2016). 
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doctrine is marked by fundamental disagreements among the Justices on how to 
analyze and decide cases. Organizing the material around the methodological 
grounds the Justices debate allows professors to provide coverage that is both 
comprehensive and comprehensible—akin to organizing a tour of Europe 
according to architectural periods rather than the happenstance of simply being 
in Siena on Tuesday. 
I.  THE BENEFITS—AND DRAWBACKS—OF A TOPICAL APPROACH 
In most American law schools, Fourteenth Amendment pedagogy in an 
introductory constitutional law class takes a familiar path, in that any given class 
will focus on a topic—for example, the due process right to sexual intimacy or 
the equal protection right against discrimination based on alienage. This topic-
by-topic approach has real benefits. It organizes the material in a way that 
students will intuitively grasp. It allows the professor to provide the black-letter 
rule governing that topic. It also provides a template for easy assessment on the 
final exam, as the professor can test the student on a fact pattern involving a 
topic, which in turn allows the student to demonstrate her mastery of both the 
content and the standard IRAC (Issue/Rule/Application/Conclusion) template. 
And, of course, the Justices’ opinions themselves employ this topical focus—
for example, Justices speak of the Court’s “abortion jurisprudence.”2 
Nevertheless, something important is lost when instruction, and 
instructional materials, are organized by topic. Most importantly, this approach 
isolates cases, treating each topic as its own self-contained unit. (Hence, the 
comparison to the confused tourist who knows nothing about Siena except that 
she happens to be there at that moment.) It thus discourages students from 
seeking connections between different topics, or from contextualizing the 
Court’s doctrine on a topic within its broader jurisprudence. As a result, it also 
discourages students from learning about the evolution of the Court’s thinking 
on Fourteenth Amendment issues. 
Consider substantive due process. Materials that simply walk the student 
through the various topics addressed by the canonical modern substantive due 
process cases—contraception,3 abortion,4 family structure,5 sexual intimacy,6 
 
 2. E.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 116 (1973). 
 5. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 495 (1977). 
 6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 
(1986). 
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assisted suicide,7 and marriage8—risk siloing those cases unless the instructor, 
essentially fighting the casebook, makes a conscious effort to encourage the 
student to think more broadly. Teaching materials can encourage that siloing in 
several ways. Most explicitly, materials that subdivide the chapter by topic 
encourage the idea that each topic is separate and distinct. While it may seem 
trivial, signaling to the student that, for example, family structure and sexual 
intimacy are two separate topics likely impacts how the student perceives those 
topics and their relationship to each other. 
This signaling can have deleterious effects. Most importantly, presenting the 
cases in a topical, and thus possibly non-chronological order9 sends the message 
that the cases do not build on each other, but rather stand independently. It thus 
discourages students from considering how a decision flows or deviates from 
precedent. More generally, it makes it impossible—or at least much harder—for 
students to perceive the Court’s doctrinal evolution. Consider, for example, a 
tour through substantive due process that considers Lawrence v. Texas10 before 
Washington v. Glucksberg,11 as several leading casebooks do. A student 
encountering the cases in that order would find it much harder to appreciate both 
the current state of substantive due process law and, more particularly, how 
Lawrence’s methodology deviated so markedly from the Burger and early-mid 
Rehnquist Courts’ insistence on precise identification of the due process interest 
at stake, as exemplified in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick,12 Michael H. v. 
Gerald D.,13 and Glucksberg14 itself. 
To be sure, some topic-based grouping is appropriate. For example, 
discussing Roe v. Wade15 but then waiting several classes before following up 
with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey16 might well 
confuse students, who won’t have the benefit of immediate recall when they 
analyze and evaluate Casey’s engagement with Roe. Moreover, abortion is 
arguably sui generis, given both the unique burdens pregnancy and childbirth 
impose on women and the uniquely compelling interests that states assert in 
 
 7. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997). 
 8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
375 (1978). 
 9. Of course, a book might intentionally or simply accidentally order the topics 
chronologically. But this structure risks disruption by the happenstance of the Court deciding a new 
case on a topic that appears earlier in the book. See infra text accompanying note 34. 
 10. 539 U.S. 558. 
 11. 521 U.S. 702. 
 12. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
 13. 491 U.S. 110, 120–21 (1989). 
 14. 521 U.S. at 720–21. 
 15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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protecting potential life.17 More generally, some topic-based categorizing is 
probably quite helpful for most students. Approaches that eschew such 
categorization—for example, those that present a purely historical, period-based 
approach to constitutional law—may well reveal fascinating insights to scholars 
and others who already understand the basic doctrine. However, for all but the 
most insightful neophytes, such an advanced tour will likely lack the needed 
intuitive, accessible, topic-grounded doctrinal context. 
II.  A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TEACHING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Another approach to teaching constitutional law in general, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in particular, is to focus on the methodologies the Court 
has employed to address these issues.18 The Fourteenth Amendment is a 
particularly hospitable field for such an approach: in writing opinions in 
substantive due process and equal protection cases the Court has often been quite 
explicit about the approaches it is adopting (or rejecting), and the debates among 
the Justices often center on exactly those decisions.19 Thus, focusing pedagogy 
on those methodologies allows students to observe the Court’s decisional 
process, in a context in which choices about that process are central to the 
Court’s resolution of the case. In short, method matters in Fourteenth 
Amendment adjudication, and the cases often allow students to experience 
 
 17. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 96–99 (1st ed. 
1990); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
 18. An important caveat that should be raised at the start of this discussion is that this Essay 
does not engage the merits of presenting an originalist or non-originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation. To be sure, debates over such methodologies occupy a great deal of scholarly 
attention, attention that presumably seeps into decisions about how and what to teach. However, 
this Essay takes as a given the imperative to teach the Constitution largely as the Court has 
interpreted it. Indeed, the very idea of a “casebook” implies that the law is generally what the cases 
say it is. Of course, books and instructors may still wish to recognize both disputes about originalist 
versus non-originalist interpretive methodology as well as the components of the Constitution that, 
by being textually unambiguous, are unlitigated. For a brief discussion about teaching the 
unlitigated portions of the Constitution, see Michael Dimino, Should Constitutional Law Teach the 
Constitution?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 26, 2007, 4:55 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs 
blawg/2007/12/should-constitu.html [https://perma.cc/4XUM-QZRV]. But because the vast 
majority of most instructional materials in constitutional law classes do focus on the cases, this 
Essay does so as well, as opposed to, say, historical material suggesting the original meaning of a 
given constitutional provision. 
 19. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Justice Scalia’s reliance on history and tradition to determine due process liberty 
interests), with id. at 128 n.6 (plurality opinion) (responding to Justice Brennan’s criticism). See, 
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (explaining, in a majority opinion written 
by Justice Kennedy, why the Court’s method of identifying the due process interest at issue in that 
case legitimately differed from the Court’s method in Glucksberg, a majority opinion that Justice 
Kennedy joined). 
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methodological choices in action—but only if the presentation of those cases 
reveals those choices. 
A. Defining and Defending This Approach 
Simply put, a methodological approach is one that focuses on the 
methodologies the Court employs to decide a particular type of constitutional 
claim. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, this approach would, for 
example, group equal protection cases and topics by whether the Court analyzed 
them through the lens of Carolene Products20-style political process 
reasoning.21 In turn, within such a grouping it would present those topics 
chronologically, to the extent possible. 
This method provides several pedagogical benefits. It gives students an 
opportunity to examine how the same methodology—e.g., political process 
reasoning—guided the Court’s thinking across otherwise distinct types of 
discrimination claims. To the extent the cases employing that methodology can 
be presented chronologically, they also provide students with a chance to 
consider how the Court used precedent from one area (e.g., sex discrimination) 
to analyze cases in another (e.g., legitimacy discrimination).22 The chronological 
presentation of these topics (and of the cases within the topics) also allows the 
student to observe when an approach encountered resistance or obstacles, or 
otherwise started to decay.23 
Consider these benefits. In addition to learning “the rule” about, say, 
legitimacy discrimination, a student learning from a methodologically-
organized set of materials is exposed to the process by which the Court confronts 
 
 20. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 21. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–768. Of course, the Court has at times employed 
approaches other than political process reasoning. But because many types of discrimination were 
recognized by the Court as raising substantial equal protection questions during the 1970s, the 
period when this reasoning was quite influential, political process reasoning can helpfully serve as 
a reference point for thinking about modern equal protection law, even when the Court has not 
employed it, for example, in the context of race discrimination in general and affirmative action in 
particular. See infra text accompanying notes 44, 55, 56. 
 22. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (declining to accord explicitly 
heightened scrutiny to legitimacy classifications based on a comparison of “the severity or 
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination” faced by persons born to an 
unmarried couple, as compared with the discrimination historically imposed on women and African 
Americans (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (plurality opinion))); see 
also ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 741 (presenting this excerpt from Lucas). 
 23. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985) 
(expressing reluctance to grant the intellectually disabled suspect or quasi-suspect class status in 
part because of concerns about judicial competence to apply such scrutiny to medical and scientific 
issues such as intellectual disability). For an example of how a chronological approach makes these 
insights possible in the due process context, see supra text accompanying note 19 (recounting how 
the Court in Obergefell explained its decision not to employ the due process methodology employed 
in an earlier majority opinion which Obergefell’s author joined). 
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an entire area of law at a given point in time, for example, equal protection at a 
time when social movements were beginning seriously to press equality claims 
that extended beyond race. That exposure in turn allows them to witness the 
more granular process by which the Court applies that general approach to the 
particular facts of the case, or, in the equal protection context, the type of 
discrimination at issue.24 In addition, it reveals that process in a way that gives 
students a chance to experience and critique the Court’s use of precedent—a 
basic legal reasoning skill.25 Finally, this type of presentation allows students to 
experience the Court working through the implications of a particular 
methodology and, if those implications prove to be problematic, to witness the 
Court’s (or individual Justices’) critiques and retreats.26 
By contrast, a student studying equal protection through a strict topic-by-
topic approach receives the message that different types of discrimination are 
distinct and have no relationship to each other. For example, such a casebook 
might lead off its equal protection materials with extended discussions of the 
Court’s treatment of race and sex, and perhaps move from there to ancillary 
(though important) issues such as the intent requirement, before presenting other 
types of discrimination in a catch-all section that walls them off from any 
doctrinal connection to the Court’s race and sex jurisprudence. In such a case, 
the student may learn “the rule” for a given type of discrimination, and they may 
even learn how that rule has evolved over time. But any larger learning 
opportunity is lost.27 
 
 24. See, e.g., Lucas, 427 U.S. at 504–05, 510–11. 
 25. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 748–49 (prompting students to consider this question 
in the context of the legitimacy cases’ application of Frontiero). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574–75 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that standard political process-based criteria would counsel downgrading judicial 
review of sex discrimination claims to review for mere rationality); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 
(expressing the Court’s reluctance to apply political process reasoning to grant heightened scrutiny 
to intellectual disability discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 
(1978) (rejecting a Carolene Products-based political process approach to determining whether 
affirmative action policies should be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also ARAIZA, supra note 1, 
at 733–34 (excerpting the portion of Justice Scalia’s dissent from Virginia cited above); id. at 918 
(excerpting the discussion from Cleburne cited above); id. at 810–11 (excerpting the discussion 
from Bakke cited above). 
 27. To be sure, the imperative to keep reading assignments (and thus casebooks) to a 
manageable length often prevents books from providing a detailed recounting of the evolution of a 
particular doctrine. For example, it is not unusual for casebooks to limit their presentation of 
alienage or legitimacy classifications to one excerpted case, supplemented by a note. A 
methodological approach allows the student to witness that evolution in the broader context of the 
Court’s thinking about political process reasoning. For example, a student could encounter an early, 
enthusiastic example of such reasoning in Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690–91 (plurality opinion), and 
then be able to compare it with the Court’s reluctance to embrace such reasoning a dozen years 
later in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432, 445–46 (“[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally 
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be 
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Due process is another doctrinal area where this approach could be useful. 
It is commonplace for constitutional law casebooks to organize the canonical 
due process cases by the right at issue: for example, procreation, abortion, family 
structure, sexual intimacy, assisted suicide, and marriage. As innocuous as it 
may sound, that categorization sends an unhelpful message to students—a 
message, in effect, that “if this is Tuesday, we must be studying the due process 
law of family structure.”28 In a sense, of course, that would be an accurate 
statement of a class session that focused on Moore v. City of East Cleveland.29 
But to so describe that session is unhelpful on several levels. 
First, it sends a message that, regardless of whatever else happened in due 
process jurisprudence since Moore in 1977, “the due process law of family 
structure” is still that stated by Moore (perhaps as modified by Michael H.). That 
message is simply wrong-headed. To ignore post-Moore and Michael H. cases 
that considered different topics—Casey, Glucksberg, Lawrence, and 
Obergefell—on the theory that those later cases are “not about” family structure 
suggests to students that those later cases add nothing to the law of family 
structure handed down in Moore and Michael H. That is surely incorrect. 
Unfortunately, this type of structure, and the resulting muddled messaging, is 
common. 
Second, and closely related to the first point, this approach has only a 
random relationship to the evolution of the Court’s thinking about due process 
rights. Unless the topics themselves are organized in a way that reflects the 
chronology of the Court’s cases, a topic-by-topic approach gives students no 
sense of how the Court has thought about,30 built on,31 modified,32 and even 
 
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps 
immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired 
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public 
at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the 
infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.”). A book that isn’t 
aware of this comparison may not present those topics chronologically, or may do so simply by 
accident. By contrast, a book that is organized along methodological (and, within methodology, 
along chronological) lines allows the student to make this comparison. Indeed, the very 
organization of the book prompts the student to do exactly that. 
 28. Compare to Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981), a First 
Amendment case that states: “We deal here with the law of billboards.” 
 29. 431 U.S. 494, 495 (1977). 
 30. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752, 762–63 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(providing a lengthy analysis of Justice Harlan’s due process approach in his dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)). 
 31. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121–24 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Moore to justify its narrow definition of the due process 
right at issue). 
 32. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (explaining why 
Glucksberg’s methodology for identifying due process rights may not always be the appropriate 
one). 
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repudiated33 its prior thinking about due process. For example, it is not 
uncommon for casebooks to present Glucksberg (1997) after Lawrence (2003). 
Any student whose final encounter of the semester with substantive due process 
is with Glucksberg is not being well-positioned to think about the current status 
and future trajectory of substantive due process. 
But even books that do manage to organize their topics in a way that reflects 
the chronology of their decision risk finding that structure compromised when 
the Court decides a new due process case. For example, books already in print 
when Obergefell was decided in 2015 face an unpleasant choice. Either they 
have to tack that case onto the end of the substantive due process chapter, even 
if the relevant topic (the right to marriage) came much earlier in the chapter, or 
they need to direct users to read Obergefell as part of the marriage rights material 
that came earlier in the chapter, even if that results in the Court’s most recent 
statement on due process being presented early in the chapter, and not, as is more 
appropriate, as the chapter’s coda.34 
Concededly, a pure methodological/chronological approach35 is not perfect. 
If the Court decides a case about a particular due process right and then returns 
to that exact same issue after deciding intervening due process cases on other 
topics, it may be appropriate to pair those two cases to allow students to compare 
the Court’s two analyses of that identical issue. In addition to abortion, as noted 
earlier,36 this issue arises when one considers Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 
1986, and Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003. Because Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., decided in 1989, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, decided in 1992, and Washington v. Glucksberg, decided in 1997, 
intervene chronologically between these two cases, a strict chronological 
approach would direct students to read Bowers, then Michael H., Casey, 
Glucksberg, and, finally, Lawrence. 
To be sure, there is something to be said for such an uncompromisingly 
chronological approach. After all, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Michael 
H. and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Glucksberg follow Bowers 
in their narrow approach to defining the right at issue; indeed, in Michael H. 
 
 33. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (asserting that the laws 
and traditions of the past half century are most relevant in determining the constitutionally-
protected status of a claimed liberty interest), with id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]n 
‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition[s],’ 
as we have said ‘fundamental right’ status requires.”). 
 34. Compare ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 642–65 (presenting Obergefell as the last excerpted 
case in the chronological order of the due process cases the book presents), with id. at 665–66 
(providing final thoughts and questions for students to consider in light of those cases, culminating 
in Obergefell). 
 35. In the case of unenumerated substantive due process rights, a methodological approach—
here, an approach that focuses on the Court’s decisional method for identifying the right and 
scrutinizing its infringement—melds into a chronological approach. 
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
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Justice Scalia defends that approach by expressly invoking Bowers (among other 
cases) in his famous footnote 6.37 Similarly, the Chief Justice’s opinion in 
Glucksberg attempts to explain why the lower court erred in relying on Casey as 
authority for construing the claimed “right to die” broadly rather than 
narrowly.38 These examples reveal the potential utility of insisting on a strict 
chronological reading that allows students to follow the doctrinal progression as 
it occurs. Nevertheless, sometimes that approach should give way. For example, 
given the closely-related subjects addressed in Bowers and Lawrence—indeed, 
given that the latter overruled the former—it may be appropriate to relax this 
insistence in that case.39 But the Bowers-Lawrence exception itself serves the 
purpose of the general chronological rule, as it allows students to consider how 
the latter case deals with, and decides to reject, the Bowers precedent. 
In sum, a methodological approach, supplemented by subsidiary 
organization along chronological and/or subject-matter lines when 
appropriate,40 allows students to see “the big picture” of constitutional law, 
while still learning how the Court decides particular cases and treats particular 
subject-matter. 
B. The Challenge of Race 
To repeat, none of this is to suggest that the methodological approach is 
perfect. If one compares that approach to one that focuses on subject-matter, it 
becomes clear that race looms as the primary challenge for the methodological 
approach. The topic of racial discrimination stands apart as one that, in and of 
itself, should matter for Fourteenth Amendment pedagogy. As a historical 
matter, racial equality was the primary focus of the drafters and ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.41 From a contemporary perspective, race remains the 
primary challenge to Americans’ aspirations to “the equal protection of the 
 
 37. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J.). 
 38. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726–28 (1997). 
 39. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 624–26 (presenting a note on Bowers after a sequence of due 
process cases ending with Glucksberg, and immediately before presenting an excerpt from 
Lawrence). 
 40. A subject-matter approach would not make sense when the Court’s modern jurisprudence 
does not include more than one, or perhaps two, cases on that subject. In such a case, as, for 
example, with substantive due process, it makes more sense simply to focus on the chronological 
evolution of the Court’s thinking about due process methodology without artificially creating 
subject-matter categories consisting of only one or two cases. By contrast, when the Court has 
decided multiple cases involving particular subject-matter, subject-matter may function as an 
appropriate second order categorization tool. For example, the fact that the Court has decided 
multiple cases on sex, alienage, and legitimacy discrimination justifies use of those categories as 
second order categorizations. 
 41. See Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Blackhole 
of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1029, 1037, 1040 (2014). 
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laws.” If any “mere” subject-matter merits pedagogical treatment as its own 
category, surely race does. 
Yes—but with a caveat. For all the reasons just stated, race does merit 
standalone treatment as a subject-matter category. But at the same time, it 
disserves students to divorce that topic entirely from the methodological 
approach. After all, during the police power era of Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court considered race issues through the lens of the legitimate 
police power of the state.42 It’s also been established that Justice Stone had 
race—and, in particular, the status of African Americans—in mind when he 
drafted Footnote 4 of Carolene Products.43 The key affirmative action cases of 
the 1970s and 1980s engaged, at least in passing, John Hart Ely’s argument that 
Carolene Products-style political process reasoning favored more deferential 
judicial review of this type of race consciousness.44 These examples suggest that 
even a question as important as racial equality cannot be examined in isolation 
from the underlying methodological currents that influenced Supreme Court 
doctrine at any given point in the Court’s history. 
This is not common pedagogical wisdom. Casebooks often lump together 
the Court’s canonical race cases—among them the Civil Rights Cases,45 
Plessy,46 Brown v. Board of Education,47 Loving v. Virginia,48 Bakke,49 J.A. 
Croson Co.,50 and Grutter v. Bollinger51—without so much as a nod toward the 
vastly different methodological contexts from which they arose. While 
unfortunate, this phenomenon is understandable. Because race is the central 
concern of the Fourteenth Amendment (or at least of the Equal Protection 
Clause), it’s not surprising that the race cases are presented together. But 
students presented with these vastly different opinions without also being 
provided with any sense of those underlying contexts will likely find themselves 
lost. At the least, the lack of methodological context may lead them to apply 
 
 42. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); see also Michael Klarman, An 
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 229–30 (1991). For an 
example of how a contemporary of the Plessy Court used police power reasoning to explain a state 
court decision upholding an ordinance requiring residential segregation, see Recent Case, Harris v. 
City of Louisville, 177 S.W. (Ky.) 142, 25 YALE L.J. 81, 81–82 (1915). 
 43. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 42, at 226–27. 
 44. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–97 (1989); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978); see also John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of 
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726–27 (1974) (offering a political process-
grounded justification for race-based affirmative action). 
 45. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 46. 163 U.S. 537. 
 47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 49. 438 U.S. 265. 
 50. 488 U.S. 469. 
 51. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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their presentist doctrinal preconceptions to what must be partly understood as 
historical documents reflecting those Justices’ methodological and 
jurisprudential commitments. For example, the lack of such context may prompt 
students to ask why the Court failed to apply strict scrutiny to the Louisiana 
segregation ordinance in Plessy, ignoring the fact that that concept—and indeed 
the entire enterprise of tiered scrutiny—lay decades in the future.52 This is not 
to suggest that students should be dissuaded from passing moral judgment on 
earlier cases. Plessy can (and should) be understood as being “wrong the day it 
was decided.”53 But as part of that act of moral judgment, students should be 
made to understand and appreciate the jurisprudential world of the Plessy Court, 
just as students reading Bakke should understand why the Court in that case 
declined to embrace the political process reasoning that was then at its zenith. 
How can a book (and an instructor) do this, consistent with the imperative 
to treat race as distinct topic? The solution requires a compromise. The Court’s 
race jurisprudence should permeate a book’s presentation of the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine—in particular, its equal protection doctrine. 
But that jurisprudence should be understood as a reflection of the Court’s larger 
worldview at that time. Thus, students exposed to Plessy should have a sense of 
the Court’s more general police power-based jurisprudence as it then existed.54 
Similarly, students reading Brown should have already been exposed to Footnote 
4, so they can consider why the Court did not use political process reasoning to 
conclude that the political exclusion and social oppression of African Americans 
in 1954 justified the strictest review of separate-but-equal.55 Conversely, 
students studying affirmative action should also have been exposed to Footnote 
4, so they can ask the reverse question: why that same political process tool did 
not justify more lenient review of the University of California’s or the City of 
Richmond’s race-based set-asides in Bakke or Croson, respectively.56 In other 
words, a presentation of methodology should accompany the race cases, in order 
to allow students to both understand and critique them. 
 
 52. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal 
Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 531, 583–84 (2005). 
 53. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). 
 54. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 671–81 (presenting the Court’s police power 
jurisprudence before the race cases); id. at 681–82 (discussing the Court’s use of police power 
reasoning in Plessy before presenting Plessy in detail). 
 55. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–701 (presenting Footnote 4 before the race cases); 
id. at 701–04 (discussing the Court’s failure to employ Footnote 4-type reasoning to the race cases 
it decided up to and including Brown, before presenting Brown in detail); Klarman, supra note 42, 
at 226–40 (discussing the Court’s failure to use political process reasoning to decide Brown and 
other race cases during the 1940s and 1950s). 
 56. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–701 (presenting Footnote 4 before the race cases); 
id. at 701–04 (noting the failure of the majority coalitions in the foundational affirmative action 
cases to do serious Footnote 4 analyses when evaluating affirmative action plans, before presenting 
those cases in detail). 
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This solution thus weaves the Court’s discussion of race into that 
methodological approach. For example, its presentation of the police power 
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment should explain how the Plessy Court 
decided that streetcar segregation was a legitimate police power regulation.57 
Similarly, its explanation of political process theory should note the Court’s 
failure to use such reasoning either to strike down segregation or, conversely, to 
review race-conscious affirmative action more leniently.58 
But by itself this approach is insufficient. Given the centrality of race, it 
behooves instructors also to present the race cases together. But students can 
appreciate the sweep of the Court’s race jurisprudence only after they’ve come 
to understand the interpretive methodologies the Court has employed over the 
course of its history. Thus, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, this unified 
presentation of the race cases should occur only later in the discussion of equal 
protection.59 But far from demoting race from its central position in Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, this move reflects its importance—in particular, the 
importance of appreciating how the Court understood its interpretive task at the 
moments it confronted what eventually became the canonical race cases. 
C. Why Not Only History? 
The argument thus far inevitably raises a follow-up question: If the Court’s 
methodology is all, or almost all, that should matter, then why not go all in? In 
other words, why shouldn’t a book—or a survey course in constitutional law—
simply focus on historical periodization and the methodologies the Court 
employed to decide cases during particular periods? Such a purely historical 
approach risks confusing students—most of whom are seriously encountering 
the Constitution for the first time—by embedding doctrinal study within 
historical periods before they have learned the doctrinal basics. Just like a first-
time visitor to Europe who is shown an eighteenth-century palace and then 
whisked to a performance of a Hadyn symphony and is expected to appreciate 
the parallels, so too most first-year law students encountering the Constitution 
for the first time can’t fairly be expected to see, for example, the parallels 
between the Lochner-era Court’s Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Eventually, as the tourist/student gains expertise, we can expect 
her to develop an appreciation for the artistic or jurisprudential parallels within 
a period. But, for all but the most talented neophytes, it takes work before that 
can happen. 
Moreover, and happily, grouping cases by the highest, most general, or 
theoretical levels of methodology is unnecessary for students to obtain the 
advantages of a methodological approach. This is because the Court’s 
 
 57. Id. at 681–82. 
 58. Id. at 701–04. 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 769 (first page of the chapter devoted to race). 
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methodologies for deciding different types of constitutional cases have diverged 
to the point that an instructor can still get the benefits of a methodological 
approach while respecting doctrinal boundaries. For example, while at a high 
level of theory one can draw parallels between the modern Court’s Commerce 
Clause and equal protection jurisprudence, those two doctrinal areas have 
become sufficiently methodologically distinct60 that a student can study and 
learn about equal protection decisional methodologies while remaining within 
the boundaries of cases that will strike the student as intuitively related, because 
they all deal with discrimination. In short, the methodological approach provides 
pedagogical benefits within the parameters of subject-matter delineated (and 
thus intuitively-accessible) doctrines, broadly construed. 
D. Looking Forward: Animus as a Methodology 
A methodological approach can look forward as well as backward—it can 
give students an opportunity to think about doctrinal evolution as it is happening. 
By presenting cases according to their methodology, books and instructors can 
highlight the Court’s evolving direction. 
Consider animus.61 The extraordinary string of victories won by gay rights 
plaintiffs over the course of the last two decades62 has largely been based on the 
Court’s conclusion that the challenged government actions were based on 
unconstitutional animus.63 Presenting those cases together, and linking them to 
earlier cases that had reached similar conclusions in the contexts of other types 
of discrimination,64 allows students to experience the trajectory of equal 
protection law over the last three decades.65 It also encourages them to speculate 
about its future, in a way that would be far more difficult if, for example, Romer 
 
 60. Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
575, 576–77 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 
3 (2017). For a more skeptical view of the usefulness of that concept, see Stephen D. Smith, The 
Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 698–99 (2014). 
 62. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996); see also 
also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 63. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Even Obergefell, in some ways, can be understood as an 
animus case. See ARAIZA, supra note 61, at 163–72. 
 64. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 911–51 (presenting the animus cases in a separate 
chapter). 
 65. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short 
of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against 
the mentally retarded . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”). 
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v. Evans66 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center67 were siloed in 
separate sub-chapters entitled, respectively, “sexual orientation discrimination” 
and “intellectual disability discrimination.” 
Indeed, the rise of animus can be seen as a response to the decline of suspect 
class analysis (at least at the Supreme Court).68 Presenting the animus cases after 
the cases in which the Court employed suspect class/tiered scrutiny analysis, and 
in some ways as a response to the decline of suspect class analysis at the Court, 
allows students to witness the ongoing evolution of Supreme Court doctrine.69 
By contrast, the type of siloing critiqued here has the effect of discouraging 
students from discovering both the commonalities and the evolving doctrinal 
pathways that actually do much of the Court’s real work, both historically and 
today. 
III.  BACK TO SIENA 
Return to the tourism analogy that opened this Essay and inspired its title. 
What would be the shape of a European tour that followed the methodological 
approach this Essay has sketched out? Just as with a survey course in 
constitutional law, the challenge of a whirlwind tour of Europe includes not just 
deciding what material to omit from the itinerary, but also organizing the 
remainder for maximum appreciation and comprehension. This Essay has 
argued for organizational principles that go beyond mere locations or subject-
matter. 
 At this point, the analogy between touring and studying becomes less 
precise. Touring requires a physical presence at the sight. This reality necessarily 
limits the thematic quality of a given itinerary, at least if the tour guide aspires 
to provide a reasonably comprehensive overview of the continent. Thus, while 
the closest tourism analogy to the methodological approach might be a tour that, 
for example, spent one week focusing on Baroque architecture across the 
continent, subdivided into days that focused on religious, civic, and royal 
 
 66. 517 U.S. 620. 
 67. 473 U.S. 432. 
 68. See generally ARAIZA, supra note 61. To be sure, lower federal courts and state courts 
have continued to consider if particular groups should be considered suspect classes. See, e.g., 
SmithKline Beecham v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 880 (Iowa 2009). 
 69. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 911–51. Cleburne in particular presents a wonderful 
opportunity to present this transition, given its tentative, skeptical application of suspect class 
analysis followed by its application of rationality review which culminated in its conclusion that 
animus infected the government’s decision. This is not, however, to suggest that the Justices 
intended to create a logical connection between these two parts of the opinion. See William D. 
Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CON. L. 621, 668–69 (2017) (tracing the history 
of the Justices’ deliberations in Cleburne and concluding that they did not intend the Court’s 
rejection of heightened scrutiny for the intellectually disabled to logically segue into its heightened 
rationality review of the challenged discrimination). 
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structures, the travel required to sort tour stops along those lines makes such an 
itinerary impracticable. Legal study does not suffer from such constraints. Thus, 
for example, grouping equal protection law according to decisional 
methodology, and within each methodology sub-grouping by topic area, is 
feasible in a way that organizing tour days by architectural period is not. 
 Nevertheless, a survey course in constitutional law confronts a somewhat 
analogous practicability challenge. Both first-time European tourists and first-
time students of the Fourteenth Amendment operate under severe knowledge 
constraints. For that reason, methodological approaches—whether to 
architecture or legal doctrine—must be combined with approaches that provide 
information in a more intuitive, accessible way. For a first-time European tourist, 
this might require opening the bus doors at the main piazza in Siena, and 
pointing out different architectural styles within the context of categories the 
tourist might find more intuitive—first, the city hall and the monastery down the 
street, both Romanesque, then the cathedral, constructed in High Gothic, and 
finally the market building and later additions to the cathedral, both done in the 
Renaissance style. 
Similarly, for first-time students of the Fourteenth Amendment, the bus 
doors might open onto the Equal Protection Clause, and the tour guide/professor 
might wish to point out the Court’s police power analysis in Plessy, its political 
process reasoning in cases from the 1970s and rejection of such reasoning in 
Bakke and Croson, and, finally, its animus reasoning in Cleburne and the gay 
rights cases. In such tours, the tourist/student is told more than “Here we are in 
Siena” or “Here we are in sex discrimination.” Instead, she is given a deeper 
context beyond that mere place-name or subject-matter. With luck, that 
methodological context will allow her to remember more than the day of the 
week she visited Siena or read Frontiero. 
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